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A Model to Explain Microfranchising in Bottom of 
the Pyramid Markets 
Robert]. Jensen' 
Chris Sutter" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Microfranchising, an emerging business model in the developing 
world, is dJ-ectively enhancing bottom of the pyramid markets 
(BOP) or markets serving the poorest of the poor in developing 
countries. This Article seeks to explain how and why 
microfranchising has emerged as a business model in the developing 
world. Approaching microfranchising from the perspective of the 
franchisor, this Article proposes a model to determine when 
microfranchising might present a viable option for firms seeking to 
operate in BOP markets. l 
This Article begins by defining microfranchising and discussing 
various business environment factors that influence the emergence of 
this relatively new phenomenon. The Article examines several case 
studies identifYing how various companies throughout the 
developing world have successfully negotiated their respective 
nations' business environments to create successful microfranchises. 
Based on the case studies, this Article will then propose a model 
predicting that microfranchising will be an effective business model 
when employment laws are overly rigid, contract enforcement is lax, 
and tangible assets or specific knowledge that are not normally 
available in the marketplace are needed for the micro franchisor to 
distribute or produce its goods. In conclusion, this Article outlines 
some of the factors for potential firms in this market to consider in 
determining whether to enter BOP markets. Additionally, this 
Article speculates that further research will follow this Article to test 
the model set forth herein. 
* Dr. jensen is a protessor at Brigham Young University's Marriott School of Business 
in the Department of Organizational Leadership and Strategy. 
** Ph.D candidate, Ohio State University; M.B.A., Marriott School of Business, 
Brigham Young University (2009). The authors thank the Marriot School's Center t(lr 
Economic Self Reliance t()r project fiJllding. 
I. See C. K. Prahalad & Allen Hammond, Servinlf the World's Poor, Profitably, 80 
HARV. BllS. REV. 48, 49 (2002). 
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II. MICROFRANCHISING 
As with traditional franchising, microfranchising seeks to 
replicate2 a successful business model. However, micro franchising 
operates on a much smaller scale with start-up costs ranging from 
$25 to $25,000.3 Microfranchising frequently involves the pursuit of 
social objectives, such as providing jobs, in addition to strictly for-
profit models.4 While microfinance provides initial capital to 
individuals lacking credit and therefore lacking a means of securing 
loans, microfranchising provides eXlstmg business models to 
individuals who may not be natural entrepreneurs.s Microfranchising 
provides a viable business model, an existing brand, business 
training, and access to a formal supply chain and business support, 
which drastically increases the odds of microenterprise success. 6 This 
section will first discuss the emergence of the microfranchising 
market, followed by a discussion of factors impacting the business 
environment of the developing world. 
A. Factors Explaining the Emergence of Microfranchising 
Microfranchising is a relatively recent phenomenon with the 
majority of microfranchises emerging only in the last few years. 
Several factors may explain this emergence in relation to economic 
globalization. With increasing pressure on developing economies to 
lower trade barriers and reduce bureaucratic restrictions, increased 
contact with western economies may help promote an.d standardize 
2. Replication involves the geographic copying of a business model, such as the spread 
of a franchise model. For an exploration of the tactors affecting the successful replication of 
business models, see lIenerally Sidney G. Winter & Gabriel Szulanski, Replication as StratellY, 
12 ORG. SCI. 730, 730-43 (2001); Robert Jensen & Gabriel Szulanski, Stickiness and the 
Adaptation of Orllanizational Practices in Cross-Border Knowledlle Transfers, 35 J. INT'L Bus. 
STUD. S08, S08-23 (2004); Robert Jensen & Gabriel Szulanski, Template Use and the 
Effectiveness of Knowledlle Transfer, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1716, 1716-30 (2007); Gabriel Szulanski 
et aI., When and How Trustworthiness Matters: Knowledl!e Transfer and the Moderatill<q EfJect of 
Causal Ambiquity, 15 ORC;. SCI. 600, 600-13 (2004); Gabriel SZlilanski & Robert Jensen, 
Presumptive Adaptation and the EffectiJ'eness of Knowlet{qe Tranrfer, 27 STRATEGIC MC;,\\T. J. 
937,937-57(2006). 
3. JASON FAIlUlOURNE ET AL., MICROI'RANCHISINC;: CREATING WEALTH AT THE 
BOTTOM 01' THE PYRAMID 8 (2007). 
4. Lisa Jones Christensen, Alleviatin,-q Poverty Usinll Microfranchisinll Modelr.· Case 
Studies and a Critique, in ALLEVIATlNC; POVERTY THR(HIl;H BUSINESS STRAn:c;y 149, 152 
(Charles Wankel ed., 2008). 
S.Id.atI51-52. 
6. FAIRBOURNE ET AL., supra note 3, at 34-3S. 
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business practices across the world.? 
In the past decade, the growth and success of microfinance has 
redefIned perceptions about doing business in BOP markets.s Only a 
few decades ago, most financial firms were reluctant to fund 
microflnance projects or groups financing such ventures. However, 
in February of2008, TIAA-CREF (a U.S. pension fund) and APB (a 
Dutch pension fund) committed $125 Million USD to Catalyst 
Microtlnance Investors in a private equity fund that will primarily 
help microflnance firm ASA International expand throughout Africa 
and Asia.9 This move is indicative of a new readiness in capital 
markets to pay attention to developing markets. 
Perhaps a more profound phenomenon has been the 
legitimization of the BOP as a viable market.]() As globalization 
connects the world in new ways, new markets have been created and 
developing markets have become increasingly important. II 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) that previously had no interest 
in BO P markets have responded to growing pressure to find new 
markets and expand operations as competition for existing markets 
has intensified. As a result, the four billion people on this earth with 
an income of less than $2,000 per year-known as the bottom of the 
pyramid-that were previously ignored have now caught the 
attention of a growing number of management scholars and 
MNCs. 12 These scholars argue that the poor of the world constitute 
a market that is grossly underserved. 13 They contend that as MNCs 
profitably engage the developing world, MNCs will expand their 
own markets, while improving the quality of life of the poor through 
supplying much-needed products and services. 14 However, little 
research identifies exactly how MNCs can best enter BOP markets or 
7. See STUART L. HART, CAPITALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: THE UNLIMITED 
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN SOLVING THE WORLD'S MOST DIHICULT PROBLEMS 3 (2005). 
S. See Christensen, supra note 4, at 149-70. 
9. He-ather Dale, Microjinance Investments, GLOllAL PENSIONS, Feb. 13, 200S, 
aFailable at http://w\\.\\..giobaipensions.com/giobai-pensions/news/14615S1/microtlnance-
investmcnts?page=gp_dispiay _news&tempPageId=70 1266. 
10. HART, supra note 7, at 135. 
II. Id. 
12. Id.; see afso Prahalad & Hammond, supra note I, at 49; V. KASTURI Rll.NGAN ET 
At., BUSINESS SOLUTIONS "OR THE GLOBAL POOR: CREATING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
VALUE I (2007). 
13. RANGAN ET At., supra note 12. 
14. See HART, supra note 7, at 3-4. 
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which organizational model ensures a successful entry. IS 
Successfully serving BOP markets will require defYing pervasive 
assumptions of the market and initiating innovative business 
models. 16 Traditional theories of business operations have generally 
been formulated in the context of the economically advanced 
nations-i.e., those with adequate infrastructure and stable 
conditions. Business environment factors often prevalent in the 
developing world-corruption, deficient legal institutions, 
inadequate infrastructure, and widespread povert/ 7 -preclude 
traditional marketing approaches to BOP markets. Given the 
contrasting conditions of the developing world's business 
environment, current theory and practice do not adequately explain 
the best way to operate in BOP markets. While microfranchising may 
provide an effective model for businesses operating in the BOP, most 
microfranchising literature addresses only potential advantages for 
the microfranchisees and not the franchisors. IX Clearly, a model is 
needed to explain the conditions in which microfranchising might 
present a viable option for firms seeking to operate in BOP markets. 
B. Factors in the Developing World that Inhibit 
Traditional Business Models 
To understand the role of microfranchising, it is essential to 
understand the business environment of the developing world. In 
many ways, developing nations can be extremely difficult places to 
do business. Microfranchising emerged, in large part, from its success 
in addressing the traditionally problematic characteristics of the 
business environment in BOP markets. Various factors that affect the 
business environment in developing nations do not seem to affect 
more developed nations, at least not to the same degree. 
A general exploration of these factors will aid in understanding 
the model that will be set forth below, though the application of 
these factors can vary markedly from one area to the next. The 
l5. See v. KASTURI I~NGAN & ROHITHAIU l~JAN, UNILEVER IN INDIA: HINDl!STAI': 
LEVER'S PROJECT SHAKTI-MARKETINl; FMCG TO THE RURAL CONSUMER l-30 (HARV. 
Bus. SCH. 2005). 
l6. See Prahalad & Hammond, supra note I. 
l7. BOP markets encompass over 4 billion people and are characterized by deep poverty 
defined as an annual income of less than $2,000 USD a year. Many people in BOP markets live 
on less than $200 USD a year. [d. at 49, 51. 
l8. See FAIlUlOURNE ET AL., supra note 3 (t()(using exclusively on the bendits of 
microfranchising f(,r the microfranchisees). 
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developing world is hardly a homogenous block of nations, but is a 
highly heterogeneous group, comprised of differentiated nations 
with unique cultures, languages, environments, governments, and 
people. Even within their own borders, developing nations are hardly 
homogeneous. Furthermore, socia-economic conditions vary widely 
within each nation, including areas dominated by upper and middle 
class populations, as well as areas of extreme poverty. This Article 
focuses on BOP markets within the multiplicity of developing 
nations. 
The following paragraphs outline several factors affecting the 
microfranchise business model in developing nations. While this list 
may be neither comprehensive nor uniformly applicable, it illustrates 
contextual diHerences between developed and developing nations. In 
many cases, these environmental conditions limit the growth of 
traditional tlrms in developing countries, creating a landscape in 
which a few powerful and well-connected tlrms dominate while the 
rest of the economic activity takes place in simple market 
transactions.]lJ Understanding the context of the business 
environment in the developing world will increase the ability of tlrms 
to operate in these environments, regardless of their specitlc business 
model. 
1. Poverty 
Perhaps the detlning characteristic of the developing world is 
poverty. As evidenced in Figure 1 below, the disparity between the 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in BOP markets and that of 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD/o member nation markets is startling. Poverty stifles two 
fundamental ingredients necessary for the development of traditional 
fIrms. First, the vast majority of people in poverty-stricken nations do 
not have access to capital to start businesses or to contribute to 
economic development. Financing is often not available in 
developing countries, especially to individuals mired in poverty. 
While microcredit has drastically improved individual lives in 
developing countries, it has only served millions out of an estimated 
19. Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Eme~lJing 
Markets' An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups, 55 J. FIN. 867, 867 (2000). 
20. The OEeD is an international organization with membership consisting primarily of 
developed nations in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim. See generally 
http://www.occd.org. 
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four billion people in BOP markets.2 ! Second, individuals in poverty 
generally lack opportunities for education, which is directly linked to 
productivity.22 Individuals lacking knowledge and experience have 
greater difficulty successfully starting a profitable business of any 
significant size. 
Lack of access to education and capital directly affects the day to 
day operations, and therefore the viability, of businesses from BOP 
markets. For example, a firm operating in BOP markets often cannot 
rely on traditional market mechanisms to provide suppliers or 
distributors because individual entrepreneurs who would normally 
fill those roles do not have access to the education and capital 
necessary to create those businesses. Establishing a tlrm of sufficient 
size to be a supplier or distributor to an incoming multinational firm 
often requires at least a modicum of financing. With poverty rates in 
BOP markets at subsistence levels, even minor financing is often not 
available and microcredit, when available, is typically not enough to 
provide the kind of supply or distribution services MNCs require.23 
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$35,000.00 
$30,000.00 
$25,000.00 
$20,000.00 
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,
- GNI per capita I 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita.24 
21. Prahalad & Hammond, supra note I, at 48, 49; Press Release, United Nations, IT;\) 
Launches International Year of Microcrcdit 2005, U.N. Doc. DEY /2492 (Nov. 18, 2004 l, 
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/dev2492.doc.htm. 
22. See George Psacharopoulos, Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update, 
22 WOR.LD DEY. 1325, 1325-43 (1994). 
23. See Christensen, supra note 4, at 149-70. 
24. World Rank Group, Doing Business Topic: Economy Characteristics, 
http://www.d(lingbusiness.(lrg/Expl(lreEC<)J1(lmics/Ec()J1(lmyCharacteristics.aspx (last visited 
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2. Corruption 
Corruption, or the abuse of power for personal or collective gain, 
is a major hindrance to developing economies.25 Corruption is most 
common at the interface between public and private entities, 
especially when the government must provide necessary services, 
permits, or licenses.26 Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures often 
increase corruption, as each point of contact with an official is an 
additional opportunity to solicit a bribe.27 As Figure 2 below 
demonstrates, while corruption exists to some degree in all countries, 
extreme corruption is commonplace in developing countries. 
Corruption substantially increases the cost of transactions and 
inHates prices through market distortions and inefficiencies, thereby 
exacting a heavy toll on the economy.2X These procedures tend to 
force businesses out of the formal economy and into informal 
markets2 l) where business occurs with less regulatory oversight. 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 1 'i ,J r • % of Firms expected to pay public official to get things done % % of Firms identifying corruption as major 
constraint 
Figure 2: Corruption Comparison Graph.3o 
Aug. 21, 2009). 
25. Rick Stapenhurst & Sahr J. Kpundeh, Introduction: An Overview of the Costs of 
Corruption and StratcHies to Deal With It, in CURBIN(; COIUUJPTION: TOWARD A MODEL fOR 
RllILDING NATIONAL INTE(;IUTY 1,1 (Rich Stapenhurst & Sahr J. Kpundeh eds., 1999). 
26. [d. at 3. 
27. See id. at 2-3. 
28. Stapenhurst & Kpundeh, supra note 25, at 3-4. 
29. Int()rmal markets are markets t()r any type of product in which transactions are not 
taxed or regulated by the government. Other terms t()r int()rmal market transactions include 
"off the book," or "under the table" transactions. In emerging economies, as much as 60% of 
the labor t()rce operates in int()rmal markets. Enrique Ghersi, The Informal Economy in Latin 
America, 17 CATO J. 99, 101-02 (1997). 
30. World Rank Group, Enterprise Surveys Topic: Corruption, 
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3. Employment Law 
Establishing employment regulations requires careful balance 
between the need to protect workers' rights and the need for a 
flexible and responsive labor force. Overly rigid labor laws may result 
in reduced job creation, lower productivity, and increased 
unemployment. 31 In Figure 3 below, for example, the costs of 
dismissing workers in developing countries is often more than one 
year's salary-more than double the cost in OEeD nations. The 
developing world is often characterized by overly rigid labor laws 
affecting hiring, working hours, and dismissals, which force workers 
into the informal market where no protections exist. 32 The 
characteristics of labor laws directly affect the costs associated with 
operating a traditional firm. 
• Cost of dismissing workers 
(weeks of salary) 
Figure 3: Relative Cost of Terminating Employment. 33 
4. Contract Enforcement 
Contract enforcement is a crucial element in understanding how 
firms are structured. In the absence of a reliable legal system 
enforcing contract obligations, businesses are unlikely to partner 
with individuals or organizations they do not know or trust, thus 
Imps:/ /www.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreTopics/?topicid=3 (last visited Aug. 21, 2009). 
31. WORLD BANK, D(llNl; BUSINESS 2009: COM I'AIU Nl; REl;ULATION IN 181 
ECONOMIES 19-20 (2008). 
32. Id. at 20. 
33. World Bank Group, Doing Business Topic Employing Workers, 
http://www.d()ingbusiness.()rg/Expl()reT()pics/Empl()yingW()rkers/. 
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limiting opportunity for increased connections and growth.34 The 
data in the chart below demonstrate that contract enforcement in 
many developing nations requires considerable time and money, 
effectively preventing the poorer segments of the population a legal 
remedy to resolve contract disputes. 35 Unreliable enforcement 
systems, which ofter limited options for recovery from a breach of 
contract, deter larger businesses.36 Firms who contract with 
individuals from BOP markets may also find it nearly impossible to 
locate the individuals if they walk away with firm assets, making it 
difficult to operate tlrms in BOP markets using a traditional business 
model involving employers and employees. 
Enforcing Contracts 
Region or Econom'l 
OECD 
Bangladesh 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
India 
Kenya 
1600 
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o 
Procedures 
30.8 
41 
36 
31 
46 
44 
Cost (% of claim) 
• Enforcing Contracts--
to resolution duration 
18.9 
63.3 
23 
26.5 
39.6 
26.7 
Figure 4: Effect of Lax Contract Enforcement.37 
34. See WORLD BANK, supra note 31, at 49. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. World Bank Group, Doing Business Topic: Ent(>rcing Contracts, http:// 
w\\w.doingbusiness.()rg/ExploreTopics/Enf()rcingContracts/ (last visited Aug. 21,2009). 
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5. Infrastructure 
BOP markets lack the infrastructure required by firms in 
traditional markets. Developing countries often lack adequate 
infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, railways, electricity, airports, 
and communication systems. Even countries that have good 
infrastructure in more developed areas may lack the same in areas of 
greater poverty. Therefore, firms face distribution and production 
challenges as they attempt to build their presence in these areas. 
Figure 5 below shows costs incurred due to poor infrastructures. 
12% i 
'1~ 1. , I , I , I , I , II • Value lost due to power 0 utages (% of sales) 
Figure 5: Comparison of Infrastructure Related CostS.3X 
C. Microfranchising Case Studies 
In light of these contextual factors, we examine case studies to 
better understand how microfranchising allows certain businesses to 
succeed at the bottom of the pyramid in the developing world. The 
following case studies provide insights into why firms entering BOP 
markets would choose microfranchising as an operational business 
model. 
38. World Bank Group, Enterprise Surveys Topic: Intrastructure, 
https:! /\\'ww.enterprisesurveys.org/ExploreTopics/?topicid~8 (last visited Aug. 21, 2009). 
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1. Igloo Ice Cream: Dhaka) Bangladesl1'9 
Igloo Ice Cream is the largest producer and distributor of ice 
cream in Bangladesh. It is a subsidiary of Abdul Monem Ltd., one of 
the largest conglomerates in the country.40 Bangladesh is a 
developing nation with a population of nearly 150 million and a land 
area roughly the size of Iowa.41 As of 2007, the GNI per capita 
(Atlas method) was USD $470.42 
As indicated in Figures 1 through 5 above, Bangladesh lacks 
adequate infrastructure, suffers heavily from corruption, and ranks 
178 out of 181 economies in contract enforcement.43 In addition, 
while the labor laws are reasonably flexible regarding hiring and 
working hours, dismissals cost businesses the equivalent of 104 
weeks of salary per incident.44 These factors cause Igloo to use a 
flexible market governance structure, characterized by traditional 
stores as well as trolleys that operate as franchisees of Igloo's 
products in normally inaccessible areas. 
Igloo primarily distributes its products through local stores. In 
addition, Igloo operates in public areas such as parks and recreational 
areas. Igloo has developed a successful microfranchise distribution 
model to distribute their product in these areas. The 
microfranchisees utilize a large tricycle, called a trolley, with an 
insulated container for ice cream. The trolley is equipped with a large 
umbrella and bears the Igloo brand name. Each trolley is owned by 
Igloo and costs 60,000 Bangladeshi Taka (Tk), or nearly $900 USD, 
an amount almost double the yearly GNI per capita.45 Trolley 
operators generally come from the poorer segments of society and 
39. Int(>nnation t()r this case study came trom observation, interviews with numerous 
Igloo microfranchisees in June 2007 and June 2008, as well as an interview with the Dhaka 
manager of Igloo, Md. Mazidul Hoq, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, June 2008. Chris Sutter, Notes 
from Personal Observation of Igloo Icc Cream in Dhaka, Bangladesh (June 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript, on tile with author). 
40. See Abdul Monem Ltd. Company Profile, (2009), http://www.amlbd.com/ 
profile .php. 
41. CIA, THE WORLD FACTllOOK: BANGl.ADESH (2009), Imps:/ /www.cia.gov/ 
Ii brar), / pll b lications / the-we )rld -t'lCtb()( )k/ gel )s/bg.html. 
42. WORLD BANK, BANL;[.ADESH AT A GLANCE (2008), available at 
http://devdata.w()rldbank.org/ AAG/bg(Laag.pdf 
43. WORLD BANK, supra note 31, at 49. 
44. Id. at 90. 
45. For comparison purposes, the GNI per capita in the United States in 2008 was 
$47,580. WORLD BANK, GROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA 2008, at 1 (2009), available 
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DAT AST ATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. 
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lack the necessary capital to purchase and operate their own business. 
To bring the franchise into reach of the franchisees, Igloo accepts a 
franchise fee of Tk 5,000-6,000 (around $100 USD) for the right to 
use a trolley and operate the business. This fee guarantees that the 
franchisee will be responsible for the care of the trolley. In fact, the 
$100 franchise fee may be facilitated by microcredit, as that sum is 
generally beyond the means of most operators. 
Each trolley operator is assigned a different geographic location. 
Each morning, the trolley operators buy that day's ice cream at a 
distribution center, and then return to their areas to sell the product. 
While pricing is theoretically fixed by Igloo, prices sometimes vary 
because trolley operators adjust pricing based on demand. Other 
aspects of the business model, such as product line and advertising, 
are fixed. The trolley operators' benefit from Igloo's advertising and 
from the geographic monopoly they enjoy. Trolley operator turnover 
is high each rainy season when sales decline substantially, but there is 
a large pool of potential candidates to draw from and finding new 
operators is never a significant challenge. 
2. FanMilk: Accra, Ghana46 
FanMilk, based in Accra, Ghana, utilizes a model similar to 
Igloo's; however, Ghana suffers less from corruption and enjoys 
greater contract enforcement and more flexible employment laws 
than Bangladesh. Poverty is widespread in Ghana, with the average 
GNI per capita (Atlas method) at $590 in 2007.47 In contrast to 
Igloo whose microfranchise model only supplements its primary 
store front approach, FanMilk relies entirely on microfranchising to 
distribute its product. Fan Milk's emphasis on selling only in BOP 
markets, such as slums and busy streets rather than also targeting 
wealthier areas as Igloo does by distributing through storefronts may 
account for this difference. 
FanMilk's microfranchisees use a tangible asset-in this case a 
bicycle with an insulated box attached-to deliver the product. 
Microfranchisees are not used as a means of acquiring resources. 
Instead, microfranchisees pay a franchise fee (which is less than the 
46. Inf(mnation fe)r this case study came from observation as well as two rounds of 
interviews with a majority of FanMilk microfranchisees in Accra, Ghana, May-June 2007, and 
May-June 2008. S. Stevenson, Notes from Personal Observations and Interviews of FanMilk 
Microtranchisees in Accra, Ghana (Sept. 2(08) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
47. WORLD BANK, GHANA AT A ,;LANCE (2008), al'ailable at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/ AAG/gha_aag.pdf 
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value of the asset) and in turn receive the right to use a company 
bicycle with an insulated box and operate the business. The business 
models for how to operate the individual ice cream franchise are 
fixed and significant adaptation does not occur at the 
microfranchisee level. The microfranchisees are not assigned a 
unique geographic area, but rather enter the areas they know best 
and in which they are likely to be most successful. 
3. Honey Care) rural Kenya4H 
Honey Care Africa provides an example of when both specific 
knowledge and tangible assets (like Igloo and FanMilk) are needed 
to create a production base. Honey Care is a company that utilizes 
rural Kenya as a supply base for honey and then markets the honey 
locally as well as internationally.49 Similar to Ghana, Kenya enjoys 
relatively strong contract enforcement, but suffers from corruption 
and poor infrastructure (see Figures 1 through 5 above). In 2007, 
Kenya had a GNI per capita of$690 (Atlas method).50 
Men and women applying to be microfranchisees need not only 
tangible assets (beehives), as with Igloo and FanMilk franchisees, but 
also specific knowledge on bee keeping. Honey Care provides 
individuals with these tangible assets and specialized knowledge 
through microfranchising. The beekeepers obtain a loan from a local 
microfinance institution or NGO and use that capital to purchase the 
hives. 51 Honey Care differs from Igloo and FanMilk because Honey 
Care requires beekeepers to purchase the necessary assets (the 
beehives) rather than simply leasing the tangible assets. 52 Honey 
Care does this to create "a real sense of ownership" on the part of 
the farmers. 53 Given the relatively low cost of the hives, these 
requirements do not seem to reflect a strategy to compensate for 
resource scarcity on the part of Honey Care. Honey Care partners 
with local NGOs to provide essential training on beekeeping to 
microfranchisees, which increases standardization of production 
48. FAIRBOI 'RNE ET AL., supra note 3, at 149-63. 
49. Id. at 150. 
50. WORLD BANK, KENYA AT A GLANCE (2008), available at 
http://devdata.w()rldbank.()rg/ AAG/ken_~lJg.pdf 
51. FAIRBOURNE ET AL., supra note 3, at 154. 
52. Id. 
53. Id.at 159. 
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processes. 54 The microfranchising structure allows for the transfer of 
knowledge as well as the assets necessary to produce honey.55 
4. Community Enterprise Solutions, Rural Guatemala56 
Community Enterprise Solutions (Sol Com) is a social venture 
based in Antigua, Guatemala and serves rural commumties 
throughout the country. In 2007, Guatemala had a GNI per capita 
of $2,440, but income distribution is highly skewed, with the lowest 
20% holding only 3.5% of the income share in 2000. 57 
SolCom provides numerous products that increase the standard 
of living for rural Guatemalans, including reading glasses, sunglasses, 
eye drops, emcient light-bulbs, and water filters. The products are 
first shipped to headquarters in Antigua and then to regional centers 
where regional managers are employed. Regional managers oversee 
asesores or salespeople who work in pairs in assigned areas and 
operate as microfranchisees. These salespeople are independent from 
the parent company, but wear uniforms, work in assigned areas, 
receive training, and sell only Sol Com products. They conduct sales 
campaigns generally lasting two days and solicit SolCom's most 
popular item-reading glasses-by administering free eye exams. 
Salespeople are trained every six months on how to administer the 
exams as well as on other aspects of the business. Salespeople work 
on commission and do not provide an upfront microfranchise fee to 
SolCom. As is the case for the microfranchises previously examined, 
Sol Com microfranchisees do not require tangible assets to facilitate 
the sale of their products. In this case, the microfranchise structure is 
used primarily as a way to transmit knowledge, coordinate activities, 
and provide access to a formal supply chain, while preserving the 
independence of salespeople. 
54. Id. at 150. 
55. Id. at 155-56. 
56. Int<mnation t<lr this case study came trom observation and interviews with a 
majority of Community Enterprise Solutions microtranchisees in rural Guatemala, June-July 
2008. Jason Fairbourne, Notes trom Personal Observation of Community Enterprise Solutions 
in Guatemala (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on tile with author). 
57. WORLD BANK, GUATEMAl.A COUNTRY DATA PROI'ILE (2008), http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ ext/ ddpreportsjViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT _I Ih 13609& REQ 
UESL TYPE= VIEW ADVANCED&HF=N&D IMENSI 0 NS=20. 
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D. A Model to Explain Microfranchising at the Bottom of the Pyramid 
The following section utilizes the three case studies discussed 
above to develop a model to explain the incidence of 
microfranchising in BOP markets. While microfranchising can 
mitigate some detrimental environmental factors-such as 
employment laws, contract enforcement, lack of access to financing, 
and lack of access to education---others are more difficult to allay. 
A country's employment laws have a profound effect on a firm's 
choice of business model. The high cost of firing an employee deters 
companies from casually entering employment arrangements, so 
firms either avoid such markets or select alternative business models 
that require fewer employees. In addition, rigid employment laws in 
many developing countries increase the cost of traditional firm 
operations, pushing firms toward other business models. In cases 
where a country's employment laws inhibit a firm from hiring 
employees, microfranchising offers an alternative form of 
governance, giving the firm a more t1exible position. oX 
Contract enforcement issues may also lead a firm to choose 
microfranchising as a business model. Where contract enforcement is 
an issue, firms generally have two options: they may choose to use 
simple contracts that arc unlikely to be breached, or they avoid 
contracts altogether by resorting to a pure market approach. 
Selecting microfranchising as a business model is choosing the first 
option as microfranchising contracts are often simple and verbal. 
Microfranchisees are often required to pay a franchise fee in order to 
receive the right to operate company assets. Such a requirement 
creates commitment and motivation on the part of the franchisee to 
follow through with obligations to care for the company assets. If 
the microfranchisee breaches these obligations, the parent firm 
retains the franchise fee (which the company would otherwise return 
upon termination of the arrangement). This simple approach 
effectively overcomes the obstacles posed by a lack of contract 
enforcement in the developing world. 
58. A traditional tinn approach operates with employer/employee colltracts. A pure 
market approach utilizes outside colltracrors t()r production and customer/distributors rather 
than employees (i.e., a tirm outsources production to others who it then buys the product 
trom and sells its products to distributors who turn around and sell to the end customer). A 
microtranchise is a hybrid structure that uses quasi employees. They do not have traditional 
employmellt colltracts and they own their tranchises, but they have at least some colltractual 
obligations with the tinn. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Ozqanization: The 
Analysis IIfDiscrete Structural AlternatiJ'es, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269,269-96 (1991). 
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Poverty is another BOP market characterization that afFects a 
firm's decision to adopt microfranchising as a business model. 
Among very poor populations, capital to obtain assets is generally 
unavailable. Therefore, a firm that requires tangible assets for the 
production or distribution of its products will not be able to employ 
purely market mechanisms for this purpose. Instead, these 
corporations must extend their resources through employees or 
some form of contracting with another party. 
Selecting microfranchising as a business model in poverty-
stricken countries is an appropriate solution to doing business for 
several reasons. The costs of supervising employees who are using 
company assets may be too high to maintain. While the scarcity of 
employment options almost guarantees that employees will work 
very hard, assets employed in distribution of products are of much 
greater value than an employee's salary. Thus, there is an incentive 
for the employee to simply take the asset and sell it or use it 
elsewhere. Given the poor legal infrastructure, it would be nearly 
impossible for the firm to recover the assets. To monitor every 
employee as the employee uses the company's assets throughout 
crowded markets and slums would be an unsustainable cost in most 
circumstances. Many microfranchises avoid this problem by requiring 
a franchise fee for the right to use company assets in the distribution 
process. This fee is generally not equal to the actual value of the 
assets because, as previously explained, the microfranchisees often 
cannot access sufficient capital to obtain the assets. However, 
payment of the fee generally provides enough incentive to prevent 
theft or abuse of the company's assets. SY 
Lack of access to the requisite knowledge or education to 
perform efficient, quality work poses another obstacle to working 
within BOP markets. For example, SolCom employs members of 
local rural communities to perform eye exams and sell reading 
glasses.6o The knowledge to perform these tasks is not usually 
available within these rural communities,61 necessitating something 
closer to a more traditional business model while still ensuring a 
commitment to a standardized business model. An untraditional 
business model, such as microfranchising, may be an appropriate 
59. This is not to suggest that dishonesty is a defining characteristic of the developing 
world. Indeed, many industries in the developed world (car rental companies, tc)r example) use 
the same practice to ensure that their assets are returned sately. 
60. Fairbourne, supra note 56. 
61. Id. 
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approach to educating and preparing people to perform these tasks.62 
Microfranchising provides a model that allows for franchisee 
commitment to standardization and training while minimizing costs. 
Corruption and lack of infrastructure, however, are not easily 
mitigated by microfranchising. Corruption and power outages affect 
all business models. For this reason, these two contextual factors, 
while important, are not included in the model predicting the use of 
microfranchising. 
Traditional Firms Informal Markets 
Rigid employment laws Assets unavailable 
Higher monitoring costs Knowledge unavailable 
/~ 
Microfranchising 
/ '\. 
Overcomes rigid employment laws Allows for access to assets and/or 
Lowers monitoring costs knowledge 
/ 
Figure 6: Striking the Balance Between a Traditional Business Model and 
Informal Market Transactions. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Traditional business theory and practice do not account for key 
environmental differences in the developing world. The emergence 
of microfranchising is driven by tlve basic factors: (1) the existence of 
rigid employment laws; (2) a lack of access to capital due to 
widespread poverty and inadequate tlnancial institutions; (3) the 
need to operate local units with assets that are valued at multiples of 
a typical weekly or monthly wage; (4) a lack of education and 
knowledge in local markets; and (5) inadequate legal institutions, 
which makes the enforcement of labor contacts difficult and increases 
the costs of monitoring employees. 
62. See J. C. Spender, Makin<q /(nowlef{qe the Rasis ofa Dynamic Theory Iif'the Firm, 17 
STRATEl;rc MGMT. J. (SPE< :J!\L ISSUE) 45, 46-47 (1996). 
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Firms considering entry into BOP markets should consider the 
following factors in determining whether to microfranchise. Firms 
first need to consider the assets and level of knowledge necessary for 
distribution or production of their products in relation to the relative 
level of poverty of the target market. If these assets or knowledge do 
not exist in the market, pure market transactions may be unsuccessful 
because suppliers may be difficult to locate and independent 
distribution channels may be difficult to establish. Firms should then 
consider the target market's employment laws and its degree of legal 
protection. Where employment laws are overly rigid, a hybrid model 
such as microfranchising may be most appropriate because 
terminating employees may be extremely costly. Where legal 
protection is unavailable or insufficient, firms may also need to utilize 
a microfranchise model that creates commitment and motivation in 
its microfranchisees and safeguards firm assets from opportunistic 
employees. Given the characteristics of the developing world, 
microfranchising may provide an attractive model for many firms. 
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